1. Chosŏn sidae Kyŏnghak ŭi kwanchŏm kwa yŏnbyŏn -- 2. Han'guk Kyŏnghak yŏn'gu ŭi hoego wa chŏnmang -- 3. Han'guk Kyŏnghak ŭi chŏn'gae wa t'ŭkching -- 4. "Taehak" haesŏk ŭi yŏn'gu hyŏnhwang kwa hyangbang -- 5. Chosŏn sidae "Chungyong" haesŏk ŭi yangsang kwa t'ŭching : Tosŏl ŭl chungsim ŭro -- 6. Chosŏn chŏn'gi kyŏngsŏ haesŏk kwa Yi Hwang, Cho Sik ŭi Kyŏnghak -- 7. Chosŏn hugi Yŏngnam ŭi Kyŏnghak yŏn'gu wa sot'ong ŭi mosaek -- 8. Paekho Yun Hyu ŭi kyŏnghakkwan (...) -- 9. 18-segi ŭi haksul tonghyang kwa Yi Ik ŭi Kyŏnghak -- 10. Sŏngho Yi Ik "Taehak", "Chungyong" haesŏk. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a (propositionaI) modal-Iogic approximation to Quantum Mechanics from a reduced and characteristic number of “crucial experiments” and so independently of the lattice of subspaces of Hilbert space. Kripke’s semantics, which determinates this system, allows to define, from a new point of view, the notions of “measurement process” and “virtual world” and admits a natural interpretation which in turn can help us to understand the measurement problem. In this way, we can attempt a “many-worlds” interpretation of (...) Quantum Mechanics, in the way of Everett. (shrink)

Vorwort - Einleitung Erster Teil. Hegels philosophische Kritik. Kapitel 1. Der Skeptizismus als Vorstufe und Moment der Hegelschen Dialektik. 1 Der systemtheoretische Gesichtspunkt der Hegelschen Skeptizismus-Rezeption - 2 Die Grundprinzipien des Schulzeschen Skeptizismus - 3 Hegels Kritik an Schulzes Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie - 4 Hegels Stellungnahme zum antiken Skeptizismus - Kapitel 2. Platonische und Hegelsche Dialektik. 5 Der Platonische Parmenides in Hegels Sicht - 6 Die Differenz der Platonischen und der Hegelschen Dialektik - Kapitel 3. Die Stellung des Spinozismus (...) in Hegels Dialektik - 7 Allgemeine Charakteristik der Hegelschen Widerlegung der Philosophie Spinozas - 8 Die Kategorie der Substanz in der Jenenser Logik - 9 Die Spinozistische Philosophie des Absoluten als Organon der Kritik an der Reflexionsphilosophie - 10 Die berwindung des Spinozismus in der Wissenschaft der Logik - Kapitel 4. Kants transzendentale Apperzeption und Hege. (shrink)

1. Yulgok chŏnsŏ 1 : Sa, Pu, Si, Soch'a -- 2. Yulgok chŏnsŏ 2 : Soch'a, Kye, Ŭi, Sŏ, Ŭngjemun, Sŏ, Pal, Ki -- 3. Yulgok chŏnsŏ 3 : Sŏl, Ch'an, Myŏng, Chemun, Chapchŏ, Sindo pimyŏng, Myogalmyŏng, Myojimyŏng, Haengjang -- 4. Yulgok chŏnsŏ 4 : Sŏnghak chibyo -- 5. Yulgok chŏnsŏ 5 : Kyŏngmong yogyŏl, Cheŭich'o, Kyŏngyon ilgi -- 6. Yulgok chŏnsŏ 6 : Ŏrok, Purok -- 7. Yulgok chŏnsŏ 7 : Purok, Sokp'yŏn, Pu, Si -- 8. Yulgok chŏnsŏ 8 (...) : Soch'a, Kye, Ŭi, Sŏ, Ŭngjemun, Sŏ, Ki, Non, Cham, P'yojŏn, Chemun, Chapchŏ, Myogalmyŏng, Myojimyŏng -- 9. Nonŏ Yulgok Sŏnsaeng ŏnhae, Maengja Yulgok Sŏnsaeng ŏnhae, Taehak Yulgok Sŏnsaeng ŏnhae, Chungyong -- 10. Chŏngŏn myosŏn, Sunŏn, Kosan kugokka. (shrink)

After more than a century in which social learning was blackboxed by evolutionary biologists, psychologists and economists, there is now a thriving industry in cognitive neuroscience producing computational models of learning from and about other agents. This is a hugely positive development. The tools of computational cognitive neuroscience are rigorous and precise. They have the potential to prise open the black box. However, we argue that, from the perspective of a scientific realist, these tools are not yet being applied in (...) an optimal way. To fulfil their potential, the shiny new methods of cognitive neuroscience need to be better coordinated with old-fashioned, contrastive experimental designs. Inferences from model complexity to cognitive complexity, of the kind made by those who favour lean interpretations of behaviour (‘associationists’), require social learning to be tested in challenging task environments. Inferences from cognitive complexity to social specificity, made by those who favour rich interpretations (‘mentalists’), call for non-social control experiments. A parsimonious model that fits current data is a good start, but carefully designed experiments are needed to distinguish models that tell us how social learning _could_ be done from those that tell us how it is _really_ done. (shrink)

As the rising costs of lifestyle-related diseases place increasing strain on public healthcare systems, the individual’s role in disease may be proposed as a healthcare rationing criterion. Literature thus far has largely focused on retrospective responsibility in healthcare. The concept of prospective responsibility, in the form of a lifestyle contract, warrants further investigation. The responsibilisation in healthcare debate also needs to take into account innovative developments in mobile health technology, such as wearable biometric devices and mobile apps, which may change (...) how we hold others accountable for their lifestyles. Little is known about public attitudes towards lifestyle contracts and the use of mobile health technology to hold people responsible in the context of healthcare. This paper has two components. Firstly, it details empirical findings from a survey of 81 members of the United Kingdom general public on public attitudes towards individual responsibility and rationing healthcare, prospective and retrospective responsibility, and the acceptability of lifestyle contracts in the context of mobile health technology. Secondly, we draw on the empirical findings and propose a model of prospective intention-based lifestyle contracts, which is both more aligned with public intuitions and less ethically objectionable than more traditional, retrospective models of responsibility in healthcare. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:VIOLENT MEMES AND SUSPICIOUS MINDS: GIRARD'S SCAPEGOAT MECHANISM IN THE LIGHT OF EVOLUTION AND MEMETICS Guömundur Ingi Markússon Reykjavik, Iceland The present article is an attempt to bring mimetic theory into dialogue with certain evolutionary approaches to human culture, i.e., evolutionarypsychology and memetics. That which immediately suggests a consonance between these approaches is a shared concern for the fundamental aspects ofhuman culture, or "fundamental anthropology." My discussion aims at (...) reconsidering Girard's startling insight concerning the significance of scapegoating in the formation of human culture, ritual and myth—or, in short, his concept of the scapegoat mechanism. Two alternative approaches will be explored: (1) On the basis of evolutionary psychology, scapegoating is considered as a cognitive side-effect; (2) with reference to memetics, it is suggested that the scapegoat mechanism is a memetic parasite. The former account is an interpretation ofPascal Boyer's ideas about group mentality and fundamentalist violence in his recent book ReligionExplained(2001). The latter consideration is inspired byTerrence W. Deacon's concept of language evolution and symbolic reference in his book The Symbolic Species (1997). It should be emphasized at the outset that neither Boyer nor Deacon are concerned with scapegoating and, needless to say, the application and interpretation oftheir ideas is entirely my own. 1. The Scapegoat Mechanism as a Cognitive Side Effect The following is an attempt to formulate a cognitive account of scapegoating based on Pascal Boyer's ideas about fundamentalism (2001, 292ff). Guömundur Ingi Markússon89 1.1. The Coalitional Reasoning ofthe Social Mind Boyer's theory of religion is firmly rooted in evolutionary psychology (2001, 118, passim)} A key concept in evolutionary psychology is the environment ofevolutionary adapteäness (EEA) which is centered around the claim that our cognitive apparatus evolved in response to ecological problems faced by our ancestors in the Pleistocene period (which lasted from ca. 2 million-10,000 years ago). In other words, the cognition of modern humans is geared to the ancestral environments of our huntergatherer past. The key issue in evolutionary psychology is to gain insight into the adaptive problems faced by our ancestors, and figure out the necessary cognitive capabilities needed to solve them. The resulting models of how the mind works can then be tested experimentally. Evolutionary psychologists also emphasize the áomain specificity of our psychological mechanisms, i.e., in simple terms, that our mind is a collection of specialized mechanisms wrought by natural selection to deal with specific features of our environment, such as detecting predators, keeping track of social relations, etc. In Boyer's account, the mixed stock of our evolutionary heritage includes a complex array of psychological mechanisms for keeping track ofa wide spectrum ofsocial relations, the social mina (2001, 122). An essential aspect of our social intelligence is "intuitive psychology" or a "theory of mind," i.e., seeing others as intentional agents, realizing what they are up to, what their beliefs and desires are, being able to predict their behavior, etc. According to evolutionary psychologists we are adapted for social exchange. We easily calculate the costs and benefits of our interactions with others. Experiments have shown that logical problems are much more transparent to people when presented as social exchange problems. In such cases, the logical rule in question is restated as a "check for cheaters" rule, i.e., the problem is to figure out whether people respect social conventions or not. Evolutionary psychologists interpretthese results to the effect that our cognition is geared to evaluate social exchange, and we have evolved a disposition to check for cheaters in social exchange situations (2001, 124f; Cosmides 1989; Cosmides & Tooby 1992).2 1 On evolutionary psychology, see Barkow et al. and Laland and Brown (ch. 5). 2 Cosmides, one of the pioneers of evolutionary psychology, characterizes "check for cheaters" thus: "cheating can be defined as the violation of a rule established, explicitly or implicitly, by acceptance ofa social contract. A social contract relatesperceived benefits to 90Violent Mêmes and Suspicious Minds Evaluation oftrust is essential to human interaction: "That humans depend on cooperation creates strategic problems, where the value (the expected benefit) of a particular move depends on whether someone else makes a particular move...." (2001, 125... (shrink)

With its long history of the rule of men, particularly during its first three decades of communist rule, China has experienced arbitrary governance and social control that heavily relied on "giants" who arose from peasant wars. Even today, the personal orders of administrative and Party officials often take the place of legal rules and procedures. China's human rights record, because of practices such as the imprisonment of some citizens for political conscience and the suppression of free speech, remains an object (...) of international criticism and disputes. On the other hand, in the past twenty years China has shown remarkable progress in implementing the rule by law. Because progress and problems in the rule of law are two sides of a coin in China, the legal circumstances of the country are complicated, and research and evaluation of China's legal system and culture are difficult. (shrink)

Handbook for Buddhist ethical aspects for Bhutanese youngsters.